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1 Introduction and Existing Literature
The global nancial crisis (GFC) has shown that the stability of the
interbank network is of utmost importance for the macroeconomy. Linkages
arising from bilateral lending relationships may lead to systemic risk on the
macro-level (see Haldane (2009)). Therefore, regulators and policymakers
need to understand the structure and functioning of the interbank network
in more detail.
Approaches from the natural sciences have been used to investigate the
topology of networks formed by interbank liabilities. Examples for the Ital-
ian e-MID (electronic market for interbank deposit) include De Masi et al.
(2006), Iori et. al (2007; 2008), Finger et al. (in progress), and Fricke and
Lux (2012). Several `stylized facts' of interbank networks have been iden-
tied, among them the nding of disassortative mixing patterns, i.e. high-
degree nodes tend to trade with low-degree nodes, and vice versa Cocco et al.
(2009). Quite recently, Fricke and Lux (2012) argued that this fact may be
a key driver for the observation of a hierarchical core-periphery (CP) struc-
ture in interbank networks (see also Craig and von Peter (2010)). Thus,
preferential lending relationships between individual institutions may lead
to community structure at the macro-level. While many authors also note
some other form of community structure in the interbank network they an-
alyze (see e.g. Boss et al. (2004)), Fricke and Lux (2012) stress that apart
from the CP structure, there is no community structure whatsoever in the
Italian e-MID network of interbank claims.
Based on these ndings, we aim at analyzing the trading strategies of
individual institutions in more detail. For this purpose we use a detailed
dataset containing all overnight interbank transactions on the e-MID trad-
ing platform from January 1999 to December 2010. Splitting the sample into
half-yearly subsamples, we dene the (intra-) daily net trading volumes of the
individual institutions as the trading strategies and analyze the correlations
between them.1 We nd evidence for signicant and persistent bilateral cor-
relations between institutions' trading strategies. In most semesters we nd
two anti-correlated clusters of trading strategies, indicating that banks tend
to trade preferentially with banks from the other cluster. This nding is both
in line with the existence of preferential relationships, and with herding phe-
nomena in banks' trading strategies. Interestingly, the information whether
a bank is a continuous net buyer or net seller appears to be the only dening
characteristic for its group membership in this anonymous dataset. This is
1See Kyriakopoulos et al. (2009) for a similar approach. Comparable studies also exist
for the patterns of trading members in stock exchanges Zovko and Farmer (2007), and
Tumminello et al. (2012).
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in contrast to the ndings of Iori et. al (2007) who performed a very similar
analysis based on the e-MID data during the sample period 1999-2002, and
found two clusters containing mostly large and small banks, respectively. We
also highlight some problems related to the denition of trading strategies.
Overall, our ndings are quite persistent over time and appear to be largely
unaected by the GFC. We add further evidence on the fact that preferential
lending relationships on the micro-level lead to community structure on the
macro-level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 briey
introduces the Italian e-MID interbank data, section 3 contains the empirical
analysis and section 4 concludes.
2 Dataset
The Italian electronic market for interbank deposits (e-MID) is a screen-
based platform for trading unsecured money-market deposits in Euros, US-
Dollars, Pound Sterling, and Zloty operating in Milan through e-MID SpA.2
The market is fully centralized and very liquid; in 2006 e-MID accounted
for 17% of total turnover in the unsecured money market in the Euro area
and covers essentially the entire domestic overnight deposit market in Italy.
Average daily trading volumes were 24.2 bn Euro in 2006, 22.4 bn Euro in
2007 and only 14 bn Euro in 2008.
Available maturities range from overnight up to one year. Most of the
transactions (> 80%) are overnight, which is not surprising given that the
loans are unsecured. In August 2011, e-MID had 192 members from EU
countries and the US, of which 101 were domestic (Italian) and 61 interna-
tional banks.3 This composition is, however, not stable over time as can
be seen from Figure 1: The left panel shows a clear downward trend in the
number of active Italian banks over time, whereas the additional large drop
after the onset of the GFC (semester 18) is mainly due to the exit of foreign
banks. The right panel shows that the decline of the number of active Italian
banks went along with a relatively constant trading volume in this segment
until 2008.4 The overall upward trend of trading volumes was mainly due
to the increasing activity of foreign banks until 2008, which virtually faded
away after the onset of the crisis. Due to the cyclicality of foreign banks'
activity, we will focus on the Italian banks only. Additionally, for reasons
2More details can be found on the e-MID website, see http://www.e-mid.it/.
3Additionally, 29 central banks and 1 ministry of nance acted as market observers.
4Thus, the decline decline of active Italian banks appears to be driven by domestic
mergers and acquisitions.
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explained below, we will only consider the relatively active banks within the
respective semesters.
































Figure 1: Number of active banks (left) and traded volume (right) over
time. We also split the traded volume into money going out from
Italian and foreign banks, respectively.
The trading mechanism follows a quote-driven market and is similar to a
limit-order-book in a stock market, but without consolidation. The market
is transparent in the sense that the quoting banks' IDs are visible to all other
banks. Quotes contain the market side (buy or sell money), the volume, the
interest rate and the maturity. Trades are registered when a bank (aggressor)
actively chooses a quoted order. The minimum quote size is 1.5 million Euros,
whereas the minimum trade size is only 50,000 Euros. Thus, aggressors do
not have to trade the entire amount quoted. The platform allows for credit
line checking before a transaction will be carried out, so trades have to be
conrmed by both counterparties. The market also allows direct bilateral
trades between counterparties. Contracts are automatically settled through
the TARGET2 system.
We have access to all registered trades in Euro in the period from January
1999 to December 2010.5 For each trade we know the two banks' ID numbers
(anonymous to us), their relative position (aggressor and quoter), the matu-
rity and the transaction type (buy or sell). We will focus on all overnight
trades conducted on the platform, leaving a total number of 1,317,679 trades.
The large sample size allows us to analyze the system's evolution over time.
Here we focus on 24 independent semi-annual subsamples.
In the following, we analyze the correlation matrices of the banks' trading
strategies. The nding of a core-periphery structure in the interbank network
5A detailed description of the dataset can be found in Finger et al. (in progress) and
Fricke and Lux (2012).
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indicates the existence of hierarchical structure. Interestingly, we did not
nd any further community structure in the network using usual community
detecting algorithms. In this paper, we identify clusters of trading strategies
in a dierent type of network based on the (intra-) daily trading patterns of
individual banks.
3 Empirical Analysis of Trading Strategies
3.1 Measuring Correlations Between Strategies
Even though the dataset is anonymous, each bank can be identied by
a unique ID-number, so we can observe the behavior of all sample banks
over the entire sample period. In the following, we will divide the dataset
into 24 half-yearly intervals (semesters) which are treated as independent
subsamples.6 In order to dene the trading strategies we further divide each
semester into dierent trading sessions. For example, Iori et. al (2007) use
a Fourier method to use continuous trade data, while Kyriakopoulos et al.
(2009) use daily data. Here we nd that each day in the sample period can
be naturally split into two trading sessions, during which a similar fraction of
trades occur on average.7 Figure 2 shows the fraction of trades by the time of
the day.8 For example, we see that roughly 25% of the trades occur between
9 and 10am. This is in line with the ndings in Iori et. al (2008), and we
checked that this observation is in fact stable over the entire sample period.9
Based on these numbers, we split each day into a morning session (8am-
12am) and a afternoon session (12pm-6pm). In total, our sample contains
3,073 days, so we end up with 6,146 trading periods. Due to the heterogeneity
of the banks' trading activity, we restrict ourselves to the institutions which
were active in a fraction of at least θ = 50% of all trading sessions in a
particular semester.10 In this way, we focus on those institutions which were
relatively active over a signicant part of the sample period. Given the
negative trend in the number of active Italian banks, it is unavoidable that
the number of banks ending up in the sample is also decreasing over time,
see Figure 3.
6Later on we will see that the subsamples are in fact not independent.
7Note that we also checked that the results are not aected by splitting each day 3 or
4 trading sessions. However, it should be clear that the number of periods without any
activity is positively related to the number of subintervals.
8The same remarks hold for the transacted volumes, yielding very similar results.
9See Iori et. al (2007) for an identication of the events that contribute to the intra-day
patterns.
10We checked the results are qualitatively very similar for other values of θ.
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Average fraction of trades by time of the day.
Figure 2: Activity by time of the day, indicated by the fraction of trades
occurring at a certain time of the day (hourly intervals).










Number of sample banks over time (quarterly).
Figure 3: Number of sample banks over time. For each semester, a bank
is in the sample if it was active in at least θT trading sessions,
with T as the total number of trading sessions in the respective
semester.
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Figure 4: Examples of banks' trading strategies in the Italian interbank
market. Here we plot cumulative sums of particular signed strate-
gies (1,-1,0) over the entire sample period. The examples were not
chosen randomly, but to illustrate dierent trading styles. The
left panel shows a constant buyer/seller, and the right panel shows
a highly cyclical trading strategy.
For each trading period and for each institution, we dene the trading
strategy as the net traded volume in Euros. Net volume is the total buy
volume (money borrowed from other banks) minus total sell volume (money
lent to other banks). Thus, a bank with a positive (negative) net volume
is a net buyer (seller) of money. Banks with a zero strategy were either
inactive in the trading session or ended up with a at position after buying
and selling equal amounts.11 Figure 4 shows examples of cumulative (signed)
trading strategies for three institutions which were active during most of the
sample period. We see a substantial level of heterogeneity in the employed
strategies, with banks acting as continuous buyers/sellers (left panel) and
more complicated, possibly cyclical, patterns (right panel).
In the end, we obtain a strategy matrix S of dimension N × T , where
T denotes the number of trading sessions in a particular semester and N
the number of sample banks in this semester. Note that in each semester the
strategy matrix only includes transactions between the sample banks, thus ig-
noring transactions with other banks that might act relatively infrequently.12
11We also dened signed strategies (similar to the approach in Zovko and Farmer (2007)),
where we assign a +1, -1 or a 0 describing the strategies in a simpler form. However,
given that our network is closed, we work with the valued version since it contains more
information. A technical reason is that it may happen that a bank has the same strategy
in each trading session. In such a case, we cannot compute the correlation of this strategy
with other strategies.
12In this sense, we work with a closed network of banks.
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Figure 5: Time evolution of Q = T/N .
In everything that follows, we will work with the normalized bank-specic
time-series (mean equal to 0 and variance equal to 1). For our sample pe-
riod, T ∼ 240, while N varies over time as shown above. In total, NT = 218
dierent institutions are in the nal sample, but obviously not each bank is
active in each semester. Therefore, the ratio Q = T/N is not constant over
time as can be seen from Figure 5. We see that this ratio exceeds 1 for the
complete sample period, so we can reliably estimate all correlations.13
From the strategy matrix St we can construct the N × N semi-annual
correlation matrices Ct between the institutions' strategies. Due to the nor-
malization of the strategies the correlation matrix can be simply calculated







with ()T denoting the transpose of a matrix.
A color example of such a correlation matrix for the rst half of 2006 can
be seen in Figure 6. Dark colors represent high absolute correlations, with
warm and cold colors indicating positive and negative correlations, respec-
tively. As will be explained in more detail below, the left panel shows the
raw correlation matrix after applying the clustering approach and the right
panel shows the ltered correlation matrix with identical ordering. In both
cases, the two (anti-correlated) clusters are readily visible, with the level of
13For a set of N time series of length T , the correlation matrix contains N(N−1)2 entries
which have to be determined by NT observations. If T is not very large compared to N ,
the empirical correlation matrix is to a large extent noisy. We should also note that many



























−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Figure 6: Example of a correlation matrix after applying the clustering ap-
proach for the rst half of 2006. Left: raw correlation matrix.
Right: ltered matrix. Warm colors represent positive correla-
tions, cold colors negative ones. White indicates uncorrelated
strategies.
noisy correlations signicantly reduced in the ltered matrix. We will show
below that similar observations hold for most semesters.
As a rst rough formal test for the signicance of the computed correla-
tions, we use a t-test assuming normally distributed disturbances. Later on,
we will provide more thorough signicance tests, but even this simple ap-
proach is already quite suggestive. Figure 7 shows the fraction of signicant
correlations at the 5% level, among all correlations, over time. Obviously,
these values are quite large, with an average value of close to 50% which
clearly exceeds the 5% we would expect randomly with a 5% acceptance
level of the test. In the following, we will provide a more detailed analysis of
the correlation matrices, mostly in terms of their eigenvalues.
3.2 Structure in the Correlation Matrices
In this section we investigate the eigenvalue spectrum of the observed
correlation matrices. Note that since the correlation matrices are symmetric,
all eigenvalues are positive real numbers (see Bouchaud and Potters (2003)).
We denote vi as the (normalized) eigenvector corresponding to the ith eigen-
value λi,
14 where the eigenvalues are sorted from largest to smallest, such
that λ1 ≥ λ2 · · · ≥ λN . By denition, an eigenvector is a linear combination
of the dierent components j = 1, · · · , N such that Cvi = λivi. Thus, λi is
14We drop the time-indices in most of the following to save notation. It should be clear
that we have a correlation matrix for each semester, and thus time varying eigenvalues
and eigenvectors.
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Fraction of Significant Correlations.
Figure 7: Fraction of signicant correlations over time, based on a standard
t-test testing the signicance of the correlation coecient at the
5% level.
the variance of the correlation matrix captured by the weighting based on
the corresponding eigenvector.
3.2.1 Time-Persistence of Correlations
As a rst step, we investigate whether the observed correlations are stable
over time. This is helpful for the dynamic analysis, since we expect trading
strategies, and thus the corresponding clusters, to be quite persistent. In this
way, the time-persistence of individual correlation pairs oers a rst test for
spuriousness, since spurious correlations are not likely to persist in time. In
contrast, if the correlations are persistent, then the clusters of institutions
are also likely to persist in time.
Since we can track individual institutions over time, we can test whether
the (time-varying) correlations between institutions' trading strategies are
signicantly dierent from zero. In total, we have NT = 218 institutions in
our sample. Therefore, we have to evaluate the signicance of (N2T−NT )/2 =
23, 653 relationships. Given that two sample banks may be active in dierent
semesters, several of these correlations cannot be evaluated. Nevertheless, for
all institutions jointly belonging to the sample in at least two semesters, we
can check whether the observed correlations are signicantly dierent from
zero using a simple t-test assuming Gaussian residuals.15
Doing this, we nd 3,203 signicant combinations at the 5% signicance
15Note that this is a joint test also on the autocorrelation of observed correlations, since
highly volatile values are unlikely to be signicant.
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Figure 8: Absolute (left) and relative (right) size of the rst 5 Eigenvalues of
C over time. The relative size normalizes the observed eigenvalues
by their total sum N .
level, i.e. a fraction of roughly 10% of all correlation pairs is signicantly
dierent from zero. This value is way above the 5% level we would expect to
occur in a purely random fashion.16 Hence, a large number of the correlations
between individual banks' trading strategies are signicantly dierent from
zero over the sample period. We can therefore expect any identied clusters
to persist over time.
3.2.2 Time Evolution of the Largest Eigenvalues
For a set of innite length uncorrelated time series, C would correspond
to the identity matrix with all eigenvalues equal to 1. If the time series are of
nite length, however, the eigenvalues will never exactly equal 1 (see Zovko
and Farmer (2007)). In fact, the distribution of the eigenvalues in the case
of iid Gaussian time-series is known. Below, we will use this information
in order to detect signicant clustering by nding eigenvalues signicantly
larger than the predicted values. As a rst step, however, we focus on the
absolute and relative size of the eigenvalues over time. Since
∑
i λi = N ,
we can standardize the observed eigenvalues to make the values comparable
over time. Figure 8 shows the dynamics of the ve largest eigenvalues, both
in absolute terms (top panel) and standardized (bottom panel).
Note that the time evolution of the largest eigenvalue is, in qualitative
terms, very similar to the dynamics of the fraction of signicant correlations
in Figure 7. Thus, we might expect at least the largest eigenvalue to carry
16Here we disregard those correlation pairs between banks that were never jointly active.
Taking this into account, increases the fraction of signicant correlations to roughly 20%.
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important information on the structure of the correlation matrix. Except
for the beginning and the end of the sample period, its absolute and relative
importance is quite strong. In contrast, the (relative) sizes of the second to
fth eigenvalues are far more stable over time.17
While the eigenvalues give us a macroscopic description of our network
in terms of the variance, investigating the leading eigenvectors allows us to
understand how much a particular principal component aects the original
variables. Below, we will use information from the leading eigenvector to
dene the trading clusters.18
3.2.3 Random Matrix Theory and Eigenvalue Density
Here we test the signicance of the observed eigenvalues based on results
from random matrix theory (RMT). It is well documented that the eigen-
values of a correlation matrix can be used to separate true information from
noise. The null hypothesis of uncorrelated strategies, translates itself to the
assumption of iid random elements in the strategy matrices, which gives the
so-called random Wishart matrices or Laguerre ensemble of RMT.19.
The basic idea, is to compare the observed eigenvalue frequency distribu-
tion with a hypothetical one obtained from the correlation matrix for N iid
Gaussian random variables of length T . More formally, for N random uncor-
related variables of length T , in the (thermodynamic) limit T,N −→∞, with











2(1 + 1/Q± 2
√
1/Q), (3)
where σ2 being the variance of the time series, which is equal to 1 due to the
standardization, and λ ∈ [λmin, λmax]. Equations (2) and (3) dene the well-
known Mar£enko-Pastur (MP) distribution of eigenvalues from iid Gaussian
random variables Mar£enko and Pastur (1967). Empirical values falling out-
side the interval dened by Eq. (3) are likely to carry important information
17Note that the rst eigenvalue monitors information about the primary cluster in the
correlation matrix, both in terms of size and its average correlation. The subsequent
eigenvalues carry information on subsequent clusters, see Friedman and Weisberg (1981).
18We also performed several bootstrap-tests on the signicance of the largest eigenvalues.
For example, we randomly reshued buy and sell periods for the institutions, constructed
the correlation matrix and compared the resulting eigenvalues with those from the observed
correlation matrices. The results are comparable with those based on RMT as detailed
below, and are available upon request.
19See Laloux et al. (1999)
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Actual vs. predicted eigenvalues
Figure 9: Comparison of observed and predicted eigenvalues from the MP
distribution, for semester 9. Black bars indicate observed eigen-
values, the red block shows the range of the predicted distribution,
as dened in Eq. 3.
about the system. Note that the closed-form solution is only a limiting re-
sult and, as shown above, the parameter Q changes over time. Consequently,
the predicted eigenvalue density under the null changes from semester to
semester. Therefore, we run separate tests for each semester, where we com-
pare the observed eigenvalue densities to the range of the eigenvalues under
the null, which can be calculated by using the observed Q in Eq. (3).20
Figure 9 shows an illustrative example of the results of our analysis. There
we compare the actual eigenvalues (black bars) with the range predicted by
RMT (red area). We see that the bulk of the eigenvalues lies within the
range of the MP distribution. However, in this particular semester, 5 eigen-
values are outside the upper limit of the MP distribution, with one very large
eigenvalue, one of medium size and the remaining eigenvalues of comparable
size. The results are comparable for most periods, usually containing 5 or 6
eigenvalues signicantly larger than those predicted under the null.21 This
is further evidence for the non-random structure of the correlations between
trading strategies, even though we have to bear in mind that both N and T
are quite small, such that there may be small-sample biases.22 Nevertheless,
20Note that σ and Q could also be treated as free parameters that could be estimated
from the data, in order to nd the optimal t of the MP distribution.
21Note that there are often also values smaller than the predicted λmin, which we will
not comment on in the following.
22We found comparable results for other aggregation periods, e.g. yearly data, and other
selected samples, e.g. other values for θ. Thus, we are quite condent that the results do
not depend crucially on these issues.
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Maximum eigenvalue vs. theoretical prediction
Figure 10: Relative size of the largest eigenvalue compared to λmax, as de-
ned in Eq. 3.
the largest eigenvalue is usually substantially larger than the theoretical pre-
diction, cf. Figure 10. Thus, in most of what follows, we will focus on the
largest eigenvalue and the corresponding leading eigenvector.
In the next section we lter out the noisy component of the observed
correlation matrices. This will allow us to identify the clusters of trading
strategies more convincingly.
3.2.4 Filtering the Correlation Matrices
The presence of a well-dened bulk of eigenvalues in agreement with the
MP distribution suggests that the contents of C are highly aected by noise.
In other words, those eigenvalues outside the predicted range are likely to
contain substantial information about the underlying community structure,
i.e. those components we are actually interested in.23 In the following, we
will therefore lter out the noisy component from the correlation matrices,
using the approach of Kim and Jeong (2005).24
With the complete set of eigenvalues and eigenvectors, we can decompose







23In the future, it would be very interesting to use the approach of Livan et al. (2011)
and set up a factor model that might be able to reproduce the observed eigenvalue spectra.
24Similar approaches for cross-correlation matrices of stock returns can be found in
Laloux et al. (1999), Plerou et al. (2002), and Livan et al. (2011).
14
where vi and λi dened as above. Because only the eigenvectors correspond-
ing to the few largest eigenvalues contain the information on signicantly
non-random structure, we can identify a ltered correlation matrix for these
groups by choosing a partial sum of Eq. (4), denoted as Cg. Thus, we posit
that the eigenvalue spectrum of the correlation matrix is organized into a
group part dened by the largest eigenvalues, and a random part containing
the bulk of small eigenvalues consistent with the MP distribution.25 Thus,
we can write the correlation matrix as











Note that the calculation of Cg involves a choice on the number of leading
eigenvalues relevant for its calculation. Here we simply use the leading eigen-
vector only (Ng = 1), but the results do not depend on this assumption.
26
In the following, we will always show the results for the raw and the ltered
correlation matrix.
3.3 Clustering of Trading Behavior
We have both shown that the correlations between banks' trading strate-
gies are quite persistent and that a number of eigenvalues of the correlation
matrices signicantly exceed those predicted in case of completely uncorre-
lated strategies. Thus, there is some evidence in favor of clustering, i.e. non-
random structure, in the correlation matrices. However, we have also seen
that there is a substantial level of noise in the correlation matrices, which
is why we constructed ltered correlation matrices, based on the signicant
eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors only.
In this section we will show that the components of the leading eigenvec-
tor allow us to identify clusters of trading behavior.27 We usually nd two
25Note that for correlations of stocks returns this is slightly dierent, since there the
rst eigenvalue is usually an order of magnitude larger than the rest. The corresponding
eigenvector is simply the `market' itself, containing roughly equal components on all stocks
with almost all components having the same sign. See for example Plerou et al. (2002).
We checked that such a `market' vector does not exist in our case; the distribution is
more uniform with roughly equal numbers of large and small eigenvalues. Note that
this uniform distribution also deviates from the standard Gaussian distribution for the
eigenvector components of a random correlation matrix, see Guhr et al. (1998).
26We found very similar results using all eigenvalues exceeding the theoretical upper
limit by a certain threshold.
27We also use hierarchical clustering techniques, which yielded very similar results. One
important disadvantage of these techniques, however, is that they remain silent about the
optimal number of clusters.
15
clusters of banks, with highly correlated strategies within the clusters, but
anti-correlated strategies between the clusters. This nding suggests that
the banks in one cluster tend to trade in similar directions and their coun-
terparties are usually from the other cluster. At rst sight, this result may
seem trivial, because in the money market there is always one buyer and one
seller, so some banks will necessarily have correlated strategies. But what is
surprising is that the clusters are rather large (compared to the number of
sample banks) and persist over time. Thus, banks appear to have preferred
counterparties in the market, which they turn to repeatedly when they are
willing to trade. We will discuss the meaning of the clusters in more detail
below.
3.3.1 Clustering Based on the Leading Eigenvectors
Our clustering approach consists of dividing the leading eigenvector into
positive and negative components. Components with equal sign end up in
the same cluster,28 i.e. the indicator for the group membership of bank j
(gj) can be dened as
gj =

1 if vj1 > 0,
−1 if vj1 < 0,
0 if j was inactive.
(6)
We do this for each semester individually, and the results for one particular
semester were already shown above in Figure 6. For most periods we observe
similar patterns, with two relatively large groups with anti-correlated strate-
gies, and a third group containing the remaining banks which are mostly
uncorrelated with the rest and therefore have no clear strategy in this par-
ticular semester. For some semesters, the usefulness of the ltering approach
is more obvious than for the example above, cf. Figure 11 for the rst half of
1999. In this period, it is hard to identify any structure in the raw correlation
matrix, even after reordering the indices according to the leading eigenvector.
In contrast, the ltered correlation matrix shows a similar structure as the
example above, however, with one of the groups being rather small.
3.4 Time-Persistence of Clusters
So far we have only looked at the structure of the correlation matrices
for each semester individually, nding that there is in fact evidence for non-
28In principle, we could divide the clusters even further by using the next eigenvectors.



























Figure 11: Example of a correlation matrix after applying the clustering
approach for the rst half of 1999. Left: raw correlation matrix.
Right: ltered matrix. Warm colors represent positive correla-
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Figure 12: Frequency matrix F, as dened in the text. Left: raw matrix.
Right: after reordering.
random structure in the matrices. Here we aim at assessing the persistence
of the identied clusters over the sample period. We already discussed the
time-persistence of individual correlation pairs in the trading strategies. Here
we check whether two sample banks tend to appear in the same clusters over
time. If so, this would be evidence for the non-spuriousness of the identied
clusters and therefore suggest that the identied clusters are meaningful. In
order to shed light on this issue, we construct a frequency matrix F, where
each element fij ∈ [0, 1] contains the number of semesters that two banks
were in the same cluster minus the number of semesters that they were in




Bt−1 .6832 .2118 .1050
St−1 .1807 .6996 .1197
Et−1 .0272 .0331 .9397
Table 1: Transition matrix: B, S and E stand for buyer, seller, and exit,
respectively.
Figure 12 shows the results of this exercise. The left panel shows the
raw matrix, the right panel shows the same matrix, but after reordering the
indices according to the size of the components of the leading eigenvector of
this matrix. The results are striking: the two clusters appear even for the
complete sample period since there are many large entries (in absolute terms)
in the frequency matrix. Hence, there is not only stability in the individual
correlations, but also in the group memberships of individual banks. Note
that this is strong evidence for the non-randomness of the half-yearly ma-
trices, so the identied clusters are indeed signicant. If group membership
was completely random, it would be impossible to observe this phenomenon.
Another way to investigate the persistence of the cluster memberships
is to construct a transition matrix of going from the one to the other clus-
ter. We nd that the two clusters contain those banks which mainly bought
and sold money (see below), respectively, so we label the clusters B and S.
Taking the possibility of exit into account (E), Table 1 shows for example,
that there is a probability of 68.32% that a bank which was in the buy clus-
ter in the last period (Bt−1) will remain in this cluster in the next period.
This is way above 50%, the level we would expect if cluster membership was
completely random (ignoring the possibility of exit). Note that the diagonal
elements in this matrix are largest, so there is a signicant level of persis-
tence in the cluster memberships. This is also in line with the ndings of
Fricke and Lux (2012), who show that there is a substantial level of persis-
tence in the banks' strategies (in terms of being intermediaries, lenders, or
borrowers) based on quarterly aggregates. We should also stress that, since
our clustering approach is only based on the sign of the components of the
leading eigenvectors, there are a number of elements in these which are close
to zero i.e. insignicant. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the proba-
bility of switching from the buy to the sell cluster (or vice versa) is also quite
high, with a value of 21.18%. This is driven by banks with less clear trad-
ing strategies, which might put them randomly in one or the other cluster.
On average, this eect should vanish since the switching probabilities are of
comparable magnitude.
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Figure 13: Transition probabilities over time. P (x|y) shows the probability
of going from status y to x. B, S and E stand for buyer, seller,
and exit, respectively.
We checked that these results are very stable over time, cf. Figure 13.
Interestingly, similar to the remarks in Fricke and Lux (2012), there appears
to be a substantial reversal in the trading strategies in the second half of
2001 (semester 5), which Fricke and Lux (2012) identied as a signicant
structural break in many time-series of the e-MID dataset. Interestingly,
the GFC (starting around semester 18) is hardly visible, which is somewhat
surprising given that core banks tended to reverse their strategies during this
time (cf. Fricke and Lux (2012)).
3.5 A Closer Look at the Clusters
In this section we want to take a closer look at the individual clusters.
The usual interpretation of the nding of two anti-correlated clusters is that
banks in the same cluster have similar strategies (i.e. tend to trade in the
same direction), trading with banks in the other cluster. For example, Iori et.
al (2007) state that the two clusters contain large and small banks, respec-
tively, which tend to trade with each other. At rst sight, this interpretation
makes intuitive sense, since two strategies can only be positively correlated,
if the two banks tend to trade in the same directions during the same trading
sessions. Note that the statement during the same trading sessions is impor-
tant, a simple example illustrates this point: suppose bank A is a continuous
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Figure 14: Most anti-correlated (signed) trading strategies in semester 3.
buyer during a single semester. With equal probability it buys 1 Euro on the
market or is inactive in a particular trading session. The cumulative trading
volume of bank A will therefore be a monotonically increasing function of
time. Now suppose that bank B is also a continuous buyer of money, always
buying 1 Euro when bank A is inactive. Again bank B's cumulative trad-
ing volume will be a monotonically increasing function of time. What does
the correlation of the banks' trading strategies tell us about their relation-
ship? By denition, the correlation between the trading strategies of the two
banks will be -1. Observed negative correlations may therefore be spurious,
in the sense that two strategies may turn out to be identical in terms of
the cumulative trading volumes, but not in terms of the individual trading
sessions. Quite interestingly, this fact has not been mentioned before and we
know of no paper that investigated the trading strategies in this detail after
identifying the clusters.29
To illustrate these points, consider Figures 14 and 15, where we show
the cumulative trading volumes (signed strategies) of the two most anti-
correlated banks in semester 3 and 10, respectively. Figure 15 shows the
usual pattern, namely one bank continuously buys money in the market,
whereas the other bank continuously sells money in the market, and the
banks tend to trade in the same trading sessions. In contrast, Figure 14
shows the case where banks with, in terms of the sign of the cumulative
trading volume, very similar strategies, end up in dierent clusters simply
because they tend to trade asynchronously.
All in all, this indicates that we might not really measure what we would
29Note that the continuous approach of Iori et. al (2007) also suers from this problem.
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Figure 15: Most anti-correlated (signed) trading strategies in semester 10.
like to measure using our denition of trading strategies. Since we focus only
on the relatively active banks, the eect is likely to be small for relatively
large values of θ. In order to investigate this in more detail, we checked
that one cluster indeed contains banks that tend to buy most of the time,
while banks in the other cluster tend to sell most of the time. As another
robustness check, we calculated the correlation between trading strategies,
using only those trading periods where both banks were jointly active. While
this aects particularly those cases where banks tend to trade asynchronously,
the general patterns observed in the baseline correlation matrices remain
unaected. We also checked that the total trading volumes in the two clusters
are roughly equal, so the clusters indeed tend to trade with each other.
Nevertheless, the examples show, that our approach may at times not be able
to identify meaningful clusters. Summing up, the story is much simpler than
expected: the two clusters contain those banks with clear trading strategies
over time, i.e. mostly buying or selling money during a particular semester.
We also checked the results with respect to the CP model in Fricke and
Lux (2012), since it might be that one cluster contains the core banks (which
are similar across many dimensions and possibly even in terms of their trading
strategies), and the other cluster contains the periphery periphery banks.
However, we do not nd any evidence in this regard.30 Figure 16 shows
an example to highlight that there is apparently no relationship between
the coreness of banks in one or the other cluster. There we see the same
30Note that this is in contrast to the ndings of Iori et. al (2007), since the coreness
of individual banks was found to be highly correlated with transaction volumes (as proxy
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Figure 16: Relation between clusters and core-periphery model. Filtered
correlation matrix for the rst half of 2006, with core banks
highlighted by black dots on the main diagonal.
(ltered and reordered) correlation matrix as in Figure 6, but with core banks
explicitly marked by a black dot on the main diagonal. There seems to be
no relationship between the core-periphery model and the trading clusters,
since the core banks are spread somewhat evenly over the network. However,
given that core banks tend to act on both market sides, it should be clear that
the core banks usually do not appear among the most anti-correlated (buy
and sell) strategies. Similar results hold for other sample periods. Thus, the
structure of the correlation matrices is not driven by the core membership
of individual banks. This is not surprising, given that most core banks act
as intermediaries and tend to distribute money across the complete system,
rather than building up large positions in a continuous way. Therefore, core
banks are spread evenly across the correlation network.
It would, of course, be very interesting to relate our ndings to external
information about the sample banks, e.g. using balance sheet data. However,
the anonymity of our dataset makes such an exercise impossible. It would be
interesting to carry out such an analysis in the future based on dierent non-
anonymous datasets. In this way, the aim would be to model the behavior
of individual banks based on observable characteristics in order to come up
with realistic agent-based models of the interbank market.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the correlations in patterns of trading for
members of the Italian interbank trading platform e-MID. We showed that
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there are signicant and persistent bilateral correlations between institutions'
trading strategies, and in most semesters we nd evidence for the existence
of two anti-correlated clusters. The two clusters mostly contain continuous
net buyers and net sellers of money, respectively. The clusters, in terms
of the individual cluster memberships, are highly persistent. However, we
have also seen that there are certain problems related to our denition of
trading strategies. Additionally, we highlight some problems related to our
denition of trading strategies, since the observed negative correlations may
be spurious. The reason lies in the fact that two strategies may be identical
in terms of the cumulative trading volumes, but not in terms of the trading
time.
Our ndings add further evidence on the fact that preferential lending
relationships on the micro-level lead to community structure on the macro-
level. Furthermore, despite nding no evidence of community structure in the
usual network of interbank liabilities apart from the CP structure, see Fricke
and Lux (2012), trading on the e-MID platform appears to be a relatively
structured process in terms of trading strategies. Given that each trade
involves two counterparties, i.e. a buying and a selling side, it may appear
trivial that we identify these clusters. However, the high level of persistence
shows that most banks tend to have rather stable trading strategies over
time, since they tend to appear in the same cluster over time, trading with
the same counterparties.
In the future, we need to explore the trading behavior of individual banks
in more detail, to understand the evolution of the interbank network in more
detail. The main aim is to build an articial banking system, that allows to
test the eects of dierent regulatory measures in a laboratory setting. We
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